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VIRGINIA'S PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTION
STATUTE: AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRICTION ON A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO
HAVE AN ABORTION
INTRODUCTION
Two months before a Virginia statute ("the statute")1 limiting
abortion took effect on July 1, 1998, a group comprised of Virginia
physicians, medical clinics, and non-profit organizations offering
abortions sought an injunction in federal court to prevent the statute
from taking effect in Richmond Medical Center for Women v.
Gilmore ("Richmond Medical Center").2 This statute prohibits a
physician from knowingly performing "a partial birth abortion that is
not necessary to save the life of the mother."3 According to the
statute, any person who violates the statute commits a Class 1
misdemeanor.4
The plaintiffs in Richmond Medical Center challenged the statute
on several grounds.5 First, the plaintiffs asserted that the statute
I, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (Michie 1998).
2. 11 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va. 1998).
3. Section 18.2-74.2(A). The statute defines "partial birth abortion" as "an abortion in
which the person performing the abortion deliberately and intentionally delivers a living fetus
or a substantial portion thereof into the vagina for the purpose of performing a procedure the
person knows will kill the fetus, performs the procedure, kills the fetus and completes the
delivery." Id.
4. Id. However, the statute excludes mothers upon whom partial birth abortions are
performed from prosecution under § 18.2-74.2 "for a conspiracy to violate [§ 18.2-74.2] or for
any other offense arising out of the performance of a partial birth abortion." Id. § 18.2-74.2(C).
5. 795 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
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contained unconstitutionally vague language.6 Second, the plaintiffs
alleged that the statute violated women's Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process privacy rights. More specifically, the statute placed an
undue burden on a woman's right to seek an abortion pre-viability,
according to the plaintiffs, because the safest abortion procedures
potentially fell within the proscriptions of the statute and the statute
lacked a matemal health exception.8 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia granted an injunction preventing
the operation of the statute.9 This injunction allowed a resolution of
the issues of vagueness and privacy on their merits.
10
In its reasoning, the Richmond Medical Center court found that
allowing the statute to become effective would cause an immediate,
irreparable injury to the plaintiffs and to women seeking abortions."I
The plaintiffs' vagueness challenge also "raised questions going
to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make
them grounds for more deliberate investigation[,]" according to the
court.' 2 Finally, the court found that the plaintiffs would likely
succeed in their assertion that, because the statute lacked maternal
health exception (as opposed to a maternal life exception), it placed
an undue burden on a woman's right to seek an abortion pre-
viability.
13
6. Id. at 800.
7. Id.at800-01.
8. Id. at 801. The plaintiffs contended that without a maternal health exception to the
statute, the statute was unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and under
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 11 F. Supp.
2d at 822.
9. Id. at 829.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 810-1 1. The court balanced the harms to the State of Virginia if the injunction
was granted against the harm to the plaintiffs if the injunction was not granted. Because of the
potentials for criminal prosecution and unsafe abortions for the plaintiffs, the harms tipped
"decidedly" in favor of granting the injunction. Id. at 811. The court held further that public
interest favored the grant of the preliminary injunction. Id. at 829.
12. Id. at 819 (quoting Rum Creek Coals Sales v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 359 (4th Cir
1991)). In particular, the statute's definition of "partial birth abortion" contained the terms,
"delivers," "living fetus," and "substantial portion thereof." Id. at 811-16. The plaintiffs argued
that these terms were unconstitutionally vague. Id.
13. Id. at 825.
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After the court granted the injunction in Richmond Medical
Center,14 Virginia Governor James S. Gilmore III, requested an
emergency stay of the injunction until the decision is appealed.'5 On
June 30, 1998, Judge J. Michael Luttig of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals granted the stay.' 6 The plaintiffs appealed, but the Fourth
Circuit upheld the stay, making Virginia the "only state in the nation
where a judge has overturned a decision to block [a partial birth
abortion statute] from going into effect."'17 Accordingly, the Virginia
partial birth abortion statute took effect July 1, 1998.18
This paper argues that the new Virginia statute prohibiting partial
birth abortions is unconstitutionally vague and places an undue
burden on a woman's right to have an abortion. Because of these
defects, the Virginia legislature should repeal the statute or at least
alter the wording of the statute to define the proscribed procedures
with precision. In addition, this paper urges the Virginia legislature to
recognize that any statute limiting a woman's right to an abortion
should contain exceptions for the life and health of the mother in
conformance with Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey
("Casey'). 19 Finally, this paper recommends that the Fourth Circuit
follow the rationale in Gilmore when deciding the case on the
merits.
2°
Part I of this paper examines the legal standards regarding
regulation of abortions. In addition, part I examines abortion statutes
in Virginia; the 1996 vetoed federal partial birth abortion statute, the
basis for the Virginia statute; and the legislative history of the
Virginia statute. Part II analyzes the District Court's decision in
14. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
15. David E. Rovella, Court Rules Attacked In Abortion Case, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 31, 1998,
at A8.
16. Id.
17. Rovella, supra note 15, at A8; Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 144
F 3d 326, 332 (4th Cir. 1998). Pamela Stallsmith, Block Law On Abortions, Center Asks Three-
Judge Panel Requested To Act, Rich. Times. Disp., July 8, 1998, at B5. Stallsmith points out
that over half of the states in the U.S. enacted laws to ban partial birth abortions, and courts in
seventeen states prevented the laws from taking effect, according to the Center for
Reproductive Law and Policy. Id.
18. Id.
19. 505 U.S. 833.
20, 11 F. Supp. 2d795.
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Gilmore.21 Part III discusses proposals to repeal the statute and to
change the wording of the statute by adding a maternal health
exception, thereby bringing the statute within the constructs of the
United States Constitution.22 Finally, part III urges the Fourth Circuit
to follow the rationale in Gilmore to decide the case on the merits.23
I. HISTORY
A. Supreme Court Rulings
The United States Supreme Court's recognition of privacy rights,
including a woman's right to have an abortion, stem from the Court's
decisions in Griswold v. Connecticu?4 and Eisenstadt v. Baird25;
these cases explicitly recognized a constitutional right to privacy.26 In
Griswold, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution includes the
right to marital privacy.27 In 1972, the Court extended the right of
privacy to individuals in Eisenstadt.28 One year later, in Roe v. Wade
("Roe"), the Supreme Court extended the right of privacy to the right
to have an abortion. 29 The Court in Roe held that the right to privacy
21. Id.
22. Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
23. 11 F. Supp. 2d 795.
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
26. D.K. WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1-16 (1998).
27. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86. The Griswold court held that, although the Constitution makes
no explicit mention of the right to privacy, the "penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendments, in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the
Ninth Amendment, guarantee a right to marital privacy. Id. at 483-86. "[ihe Bill of Rights
have preumberas, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance." Id. at 484.
28. 405 U.S. at 453. The Supreme Court in Eisenstadt stated, "[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." Id. (second emphasis added).
29. 410 U.S. 113, 153. In Roe, the plaintiff, a pregnant woman, brought suit to enjoin the
enforcement of Texas criminal statutes criminalizing abortions except to save the life of the
mother. Id. at 120. The Court held that "a state criminal abortion statute... that excepts from
criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy
stage and without recognition of other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 164.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol55/iss1/11
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constitutes a fundamental liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 °
In Roe, the Court stated that the State retained two legitimate interests
in the abortion context: "preserving and protecting the health of the
pregnant woman," and "protecting the potentiality of human life."31
The Roe Court balanced the two competing interests and determined
the extent of constitutional abortion regulations.
32
In 1992, the Court in Casey reaffirmed Roe in part and overturned
it in part.33 The Court in Casey recognized a woman's right to have
an abortion pre-viability and to obtain it without undue interference
from the State.34 In addition, the Supreme Court affirmed the State's
power to restrict abortions subsequent to fetal viability, if the law
contains exceptions for pregnancies endangering the mother's life or
health. Casey also validated the State's interests in protecting the
health of the mother and of the potential life.36
30. Id. at 153. The Supreme Court declared, "[tihis right of privacy, whether it be founded
in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as
we feel it is... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy." Id.
31 Id. at 162.
32. Id. at 163-65. The Court held that during the first trimester, abortions cannot be
regulated because abortions are safer for a mother's health than carrying to term; therefore, the
State lacks "legitimate interests" in the health of the mother. Id. at 163. Further, the Court held
that, after the end of the first trimester, the State "may regulate the abortion procedure to the
extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health." Finally, the court also held that upon viability the State can regulate and ban abortion
-'except where it is necessary... for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." Id. at
164-65.
33 505 U.S. at 878-79. In Casey, the Supreme Court rejected Roe's trimester framework
and held that a statute that imposes an "undue burden" pre-viability is unconstitutional. Id. at
870, 878. After viability, the state may prohibit all abortions not necessary to protect the health
or life of the mother. Id. at 879. Significantly, the Court never mentioned "privacy" and relied,
instead, on "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 846-47.
34. 505 U.S. at 876-77. The Supreme Court found that a state regulation placed an "undue
burden" on a woman's right to have an abortion when "[it] has the purpose or effect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a non-viable fetus." Id. at
877 (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 879.
36. Id. at 846.
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B. Methods ofAbortion
Throughout history American doctors used various methods to
perform abortions.37 Although some methods of abortion were
socially acceptable, other types of abortion lead to the enactment of
laws banning abortion procedures.38 These statutes often vaguely
describe the procedure intended to be proscribed and unintentionally
brought other abortion procedures into their scope.39 Therefore, an
explanation of abortion procedures currently used, and the
distinguishing characteristics of each procedure are necessary to
understand the statutes.
Doctors refer to the most common abortion procedure in the first
trimester of pregnancy as "suction curettage" or vacuum aspiration.4 °
In suction curettage, a doctor removes the fetus by a tube attached to
a vacuum generator.41 The most frequent second trimester abortion
37. See generally Richmond Medical Center, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 801-04 (describing various
abortion methods).
38. State lawyers called the procedure prohibited by the Virginia partial birth abortion
statute a "rogue procedure." R1H. Melton, Trial Begins On Ban of Late-Term Abortions;
Opponents Say Va. Law Too Vague, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1998 at B5. A Virginian Reverend
declared partial birth abortions, "an abominable taking of an innocent human life." Rev. Donald
Spitz, Director, Pro-Life Virginia, Metropolitan Times; Metropolitan Voices: Truth Is Not
Being Reported On Partial-Birth Abortions, Wash. Times, July 30, 1998 at C2.
ALA. CODE §§ 26-23-1 etseq. (1998) (banning "partial birth abortions"); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3603.01(A) (West 1998) (same); 1997 ILL. LEGIS. SERV. 90-560 (Vest) (same);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.162221(1)&(m), 333.16226, 333.17016, 333.17516 (banning
"partial birth abortions" and establishing punishment for health care providers); 1997 NEB.
LAWS 23; 1995 OHIO LAWS 135; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
74.2(A); WIS. STAT. ANN. § § 895.038, 940.16 (West 1998) (banning "partial birth abortions"
and creating civil liability for providers thereof).
39. The plaintiffs in Gilmore argued that the Virginia law vaguely described the procedure
and unintentionally brought other procedures into its scope. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 818-19. The court
found that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits of their argument. Id.
40. See, e.g., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 801-02.
41. Id. at 801. The court in Gilmore explained:
In this procedure, the doctor mechanically dilates the cervix with metal rods and
removes the embryo or the fetus by means of negative suction. To do this, the
physician inserts a tube or cannula, which is attached to a vacuum generator, through
the vagina into the uterus....
[D]ifferent physicians use different techniques and methods.. .. [One of the
testifying doctors] often finds it necessary to use forceps to grasp part of the fetus and
remove it from the uterus. Of course, when this occurs, the removed parts pass into
and through the vagina via the cannula. It is undisputed that most often the fetus has
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol55/iss1/11
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procedure is called "Dilatation and Evacuation" ("D & E"). 2 The D
& E procedure involves removing the fetus from the mother via a
large suction curette and forceps, and "typically entails dismembering
the fetus."43
A variation of D & E called the Intact Dilatation and Extraction
("D & X") method or the "Intact D & E," removes the fetus without
dismembering it.44 In a D & X procedure, the doctor delivers all of
the fetus except the skull, but the doctor must extract the contents of
the skull before delivering the entire fetus. One infrequently used
cardiac activity and hence is living at the outset of the suction curettage procedure but
that generally no effort is made to determine whether the fetus is or is not living.
However, the fetus unquestionably is killed when removed from the uterus or during
the suction curettage procedure....
[Sluction curettage often results in the removal of fetal parts... without removal of
the entire fetus. If this occurs, the part of the fetus remaining in the uterus can be living
because fetal tissue would not necessarily die upon removal of a limb.
Id. at 801-02.
42. Id. at 802. Ninety-six percent of abortions performed in the United States after the first
trimester are D & E abortions. Id
43. Id. (citing Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 198 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036, 118 S. Ct 1347 (1998). The Sixth Circuit in Voinovich
explained,
In the D & E procedure, the physician inserts laminaria into the pregnant woman's
cervix .... Once the woman's cervix is dilated, a suction curette of larger diameter
than that used in the suction curettage procedure is placed through the cervix and into
the uterus. With the suction curette, the physician can remove some or all of the fetal
tissue. However, the torso and the head of the fetus often cannot be removed using the
suction curette. Therefore, the D & E procedure typically entails dismembering the
fetus, beginning with the extremities, by means of suction curettage and forceps. The
most difficult part of the D & E procedure is the removal of the fetal head from the
woman's uterus, because it is often too large to fit through the partially dilated cervix.
130 F.3d at 198. The court in Gilmore further explained, "Often, the skull (calvarium) is too
large to pass through the cervix whole and the physician must compress it to complete the
abortion. As a general proposition, the fetus is removed in parts, but often it can be removed
intact." 11 F. Supp. 2d at 802. The court in Gilmore noted that some doctors deliberately pull
the umbilical cord out first and sever it, thereby killing the fetus, and sometimes doctors pulls a
limb from the cervix and remove the limb from the torso, again killing the fetus. Id.
44. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
45. Id. The court in Gilmore explained as follows:
[T]he physician pulls a lower extremity into the vagina and then uses his fingers to
deliver the lower extremity and then the torso followed by the shoulders and the upper
extremities. At that point, the skull is lodged at the internal cervical os. Usually the
dilation is insufficient for the skull to pass through. At that point, the surgeon slides his
or her fingers along the back of the fetus; uses a pair of blunt curved scissors to rupture
1999]
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alternative to D & E, the "induction method," which involves
chemically-induced labor.46 Finally, two surgical alternatives to
abortion exist: a hysterotomy 4
7 and a hysterectomy. 48
C. Recent Statutory Enactments
Partial birth abortions and, in particular, the D & X procedure
came under moral and legislative scrutiny in recent years. In 1996,
Congress drafted a bill proscribing partial birth abortions (aimed at
prohibiting the D & X procedure); President Clinton vetoed the bill
because it lacked a maternal health exception.49
The Virginia legislature drafted a statute banning partial birth
abortions based on the vetoed federal legislation.50 In March of 1998,
the Virginia bill prohibiting partial birth abortions passed the Virginia
House of Representatives by a vote of 79-20 and passed the Virginia
Senate by a vote of 32-8. 51 Virginia governor James Gilmore signed
the partial birth abortion bill into law on April 13, 1998.2
D. The Richmond Medical Center Case
In Richmond Medical Center,5 3 the District Court performed a
detailed, well-reasoned analysis of Virginia's partial birth abortion
the base of the skull; and uses a suction catheter to evacuate the contents of the skull
and then applies traction to the fetus to remove it from the patient.
Id.
46. Id. at 803. The court in Gilmore stated that "[t]he only safe and routinely performed
alternative to D & E after approximately 15 weeks is the induction abortion which accounts for
approximately 4% of post-first trimester abortions nationwide." Id.
47. Id. "A hysterotomy is a cesarean section accomplished before term[.]" Id.
48. Id. "A hysterectomy is the removal of the uterus," which sterilizes a woman. Id.
49. Sandra Sobieraj, Clinton Vetoes Ban On Partial-Birth Abortions Again; Legislation
Would Have Barred Delivery Of Fetus, Legs First, Then Drainage Of Skull, THE HARRISBURG
PATRIOT, Oct. 11, 1997, at A5.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2. See Dominic Perella, Appeals Court Keeps State's
"Partial-Birth" Abortion Ban In Effect, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS POLITICAL SERVICE, July 30,
1998.
51. Laura LaFay & Warren Fiske, Assembly Embraces Conservative Issue, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT AND THE LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Mar. 12, 1998 at Al.
52. 11 F. Supp.2dat799.
53. Id.
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statute.54 First, the court discussed the statute's prohibitions and its
definition of "partial birth abortion." 55 The court noted that the statute
proscribes partial birth abortions unless necessary to save the
mother's life.5 6 Then, the court examined the statute's definition of
partial birth abortion and stated that the statute failed to define
several terms used in the statute's definition of partial birth abortion,
including the word "delivers," and the phrases "living fetus" and "a
substantial portion thereof.,57 The court stated that the term "partial
birth abortion" had "no accepted medical meaning" and that the term
is "coined by legislators, anti-abortion activists, and the media.,
58
After addressing the statute's language, the Richmond Medical
Center court turned to the history of abortion laws in Virginia.59 The
court also attempted to determine whether the statute contained
unconstitutionally vague language, or language so vague and broad
that the wording "encompass[ed] two key methods of abortion now
performed by the plaintiffs," thereby imposing an undue burden on a
woman's right to have an abortion.60 Finally, the court noted the
plaintiff s argument that the statute violated Casey because it failed to
provide a maternal health exception.
61
To address the validity of the statute the court examined the
nature, timing, and relative safety of various abortion procedures.
62
The court recognized that suction curettage, the most common
abortion procedure during the first trimester, "carries a lesser risk of
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2(A).
55. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 799-800.
56. Id. at 799.
57. I1 F. Supp. 2d at 799. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2(B). The statute defines partial
birth abortion as:
an abortion in which the person performing the abortion deliberately and intentionally
delivers a living fetus or a substantial portion thereof into the vagina for the purpose of
performing a procedure the person knows will kill the fetus, performs the procedure,
kills the fetus and completes the delivery.
Id
58. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 799. In addition, the court noted that the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists issued a policy statement equating the term "partial birth
abortion" with "[I]ntact D & X." Id.
59. Id. at 800-01.
60. Id.
61. IIF. Supp. 2d at 801.
62. Id. at 801-04. See also supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
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mortality and morbidity than does carrying a pregnancy to term."
63
Furthermore, the Richmond Medical Center court noted that
approximately ninety-six percent of all abortions performed in the
United States after the first trimester of pregnancy are D & E
abortions, the safest abortions available after the first trimester.
64
Both the induction method and surgical procedures carry a greater
risk than D & E abortions, and doctors rarely use these methods.65
Finally, doctors perform D & X abortion method as an alternative for
D & E because D & X procedures follow a similar method to D & E
(except D & X does not include dismemberment).66 Because
dismemberment after the first twenty weeks of pregnancy often
becomes difficult due to tougher fetal tissue, doctors rely on D & X
rather than D & E.67
After addressing the issue of standing, the Richmond Medical
Center court determined whether to grant the plaintiff's request for
injunctive relief.68 The court found that the plaintiffs risked
63. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 801,804.
64. Id. at 802, 804. D & E abortions become more common after the first trimester
because they constitute the safest procedure after the fetus grows too large to be removed by
suction alone. Id. at 802. Suction curettage constitutes a greater risk than D & E, after the first
trimester, because fetal tissue becomes stronger, slowing down the suction curettage procedure,
"thereby resulting in greater maternal blood loss." Id.
65. Id. at 803. The induction method involves greater risk than a D & E because induction
"involves the same physiological stress, emotional stress, medical complications, and risks as




68. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 804-06. The discussion of standing is beyond the scope of this paper.
In the Fourth Circuit, courts rely on a four-factor, sliding scale, "hardship balancing test" to
determine the need for preliminary injunctive relief. Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med.
Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991). The factors include "(1) the likelihood of irreparable
harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied, (2) the likelihood of harm to the
defendant if the requested relief is granted, (3) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on
the merits, and (4) the public interest." Richmond Med. Center, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 806. The
Fourth Circuit balancing test proceeds as follows: the first two factors are balanced against each
other, and if the balance of these factors:
'tips decidedly' in favor of the plaintiffs], a preliminary injunction will be
granted 'if the plaintffs] [have] raised questions going to the merits so
serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for
litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.' As the balance tips
away from the plaintiff[s], a stronger showing on the merits is required....
[1]f the balance of harm strongly favors the plaintiffs, it is not required that the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol55/iss1/11
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irreparable harm if the court refused to grant an injunction because of
the threat of criminal prosecution.6 9 The defendants in Richmond
Medical Center argued that the abortion procedures performed by the
plaintiffs fell outside the scope of the statute.70 In their argument, the
defendants pointed to the fact that the plaintiffs do not perform D &
X procedures and statements by the Virginia Commonwealth
Attorneys and the Virginia Attorney General, pledging not to
prosecute physicians for performing "suction curettage abortions,
drug-induced abortions, induction abortions, and so-called
'conventional D & E' abortions[.],, 71 As a result of the court's
analysis of the various abortion procedures, the court disagreed with
the defendants and found that the plaintiffs risked irreparable injury.72
Continuing the analysis, the Richmond Medical Center court
noted that the plaintiff physicians, in performing D & E abortions,
sometimes remove the intact fetus through the cervix (a safer method
for the mother), thereby placing the procedure outside the scope of
the Commonwealth Attorneys' definition of D & E abortions.7
Therefore, the court held that "[b]ecause the D & E procedure, as
performed by the plaintiffs, does not fall within the definition of a
procedure that the defendants assert would not be prosecuted, it is
quite possible, if not likely, that the plaintiffs could be prosecuted
under the act."74 Moreover, the court found that the Commonwealth
Attorneys' statements expressing an intent not to prosecute
plaintiffs make a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits.
Id. at 807 (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd., 952 F.2d at 812-13) (emphasis in original).
69, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 807. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs could be prosecuted for
abortions legal under Roe and Casey. Id.
70. Id
71. Id.
The Commonwealth Attorneys all define "conventional D & E" as:
an abortion procedure technique in which "the physician [after dilating the
cervix and removing the dilators] then ruptures the membranes, and
dismembers the fetus in the uterine cavity using sharp instruments such as
forceps, and suction [and] then removes the fetal parts by pulling them out
piece by piece through the cervical os.
Id at 808.
72. Id at 810.
73. Id. at 808.
74. Id,
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physicians for performing certain types of abortion procedures failed
to bind the state to its position.7
The court's opinion in Richmond Medical Center regarding
irreparable injury to the plaintiffs contains sound and accurate
reasoning because physicians will be left with two choices:
continuing to perform constitutionally protected abortions, thereby
risking prosecution and irreversible punishment, or refusing to
perform D & E (and other types of constitutionally protected
abortions) due to the legitimate fear of prosecution for an
unintentional violation of the statute.76
After determining that the plaintiffs risked irreparable injury, the
court in Richmond medical Center held that the plaintiffs' patients
also risked irreparable injury absent an injunction." Specifically, the
court found that patients may not receive the safest and most
appropriate medical care if physicians stop performing abortions
altogether due to the fear of prosecution, or if "physicians [are]
forced to resort to less safe medical procedures which expose the
patients to a greater degree of risk to their health., 78 Furthermore, the
court reasonably and prudently held that the patient suffers an
irreparable injury if a doctor performs an unsafe procedure which
detrimentally affects her health, and because the patient suffers
irreparable injuries if the statute causes physicians to delay her
abortion, thereby increasing the risks associated with the delayed
abortion procedures.79
75. Richmond Med. Center, I 1 F. Supp. 2d at 809-09. The court relied on the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 395
(1988).
76. In cases in which the intact, living fetus passes through the cervix, a substantial
possibility exists that this type of procedure falls within the proscriptions of the partial birth
abortion statute because this procedure involves the delivery of a living fetus into the vagina for
the purpose of performing a procedure the physician knows will kill the fetus. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-74.2(A). The court in Richmond Medical Center stated that if it denied an
injunction, the statute would "chill the plaintiffs' ability to provide safe medical care for their
patients who choose, or are required for medical reasons to obtain, constitutionally protected
abortions." I 1 F. Supp. 2d at 809.
77. I1 F. Supp. 2d at 809.
78. Id.
79. Id. "Because any delay in abortion increases the risk of the procedure and of harm to
the life and health of the woman, a patient faced with these choices will suffer irreparable
harm." Id. at 809-10.
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Next, the Richmond Medical Center court considered the
likelihood of harm to the defendants if the injunction were granted. 0
The court found no evidence that the State possessed a legitimate
interest in the mother's health because the procedures intended to be
prohibited by the statute fail to endanger the mother's health.1
Furthermore, they also found that, because the State's interest in fetal
viability fail to outweigh the interests of the mother until viability, the
potential harm to the state also fails to significantly tip the balance of
the harms in favor of the State. 2 The court's decision is also fair
because it follows the dictates of the Supreme Court and because the
decision recognizes that patients and physicians retain strong interests
throughout the term of the pregnancy, as opposed to the interests of
the State, which only receives protection after viability.
The court then considered the likelihood of success on the merits
for the plaintiffs' argument that the contained unconstitutionally
vague language.8 3 The plaintiffs argued that vagueness of the
following words: "partial birth abortion," "living fetus," "or a
substantial portion thereof," and "deliver" rendered the statute void.
8 4
Although the plain language of the statute fails to mention the term
"D & X," the defendants argued that the statute referred only to D &
X abortions because the term "partial birth abortion" means only "D
80. Id. at 810-11. The defendants argued that the state retained five interests: "(1)
protecting the individual lives of children who have been partially born; (2) protecting the
dignity of human life and society's respect for human life; (3) preserving the integrity of the
health care profession; (4) preventing cruelty to living beings; and (5) protecting the lives and
health of women," Id. at 810. The court found the only potential State interests relevant in the
abortion context included protecting the health of the mother and the potential life. Id. The
Supreme Court in Casey, enumerated these interests as the only relevant state interests in the
abortion context. 505 U.S. 877-78.
81. llF.Supp.2dat8ll.
82. Id. The court found support for its holding in Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
83. 11F. Supp. 2datSll.
When considering a challenge to a criminal statute under the void for vagueness
doctrine, it must be determined: (1) whether the penal statute defines the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct
is prohibited; and (2) whether the criminal offense is described in a manner that does
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Id (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
84. Id. at 812. The plaintiffs argued that the statute was so vague as to comprehend
several conventional types of abortions. Id.
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& X" procedures.85 The court rejected the defendants' argument,
reasoning that "the term 'partial birth abortion' lacks any medical
meaning., 86 Moreover, the court in Richmond Medical Center noted
that the considerable confusion concerning the term partial birth
abortion: "the defendants themselves ... demonstrate confusion over
the procedure, or procedures which they think is or are 'clearly'
banned .... [T]hroughout the defendants' opposition papers, they
argue alternatively that the Act will ban 'certain procedures,' but at
other times they say it bans only the 'partial birth abortion
procedure."
87
Next, the Richmond Medical Center court considered the
arguments regarding the vagueness of the various terms defining
partial birth abortion in the statute.88 Beginning with the term
"delivers," the court noted that the term retained a broad definition in
obstetrics, including "anything that is removed from the uterus,
which includes a baby, an intact fetus, a fetal part, or the placenta or
umbilical cord.",89 The court found further that a delivery occurs in
"every safe and common method of abortion." 90 Therefore, the term
delivery not only defines D & X abortions, but, as the court observed,
also applies to suction curettage abortions.91
Continuing its analysis, the court in Richmond Medical Center
attempted to find the meaning of "living fetus," another term used to
85. Id.
86. Id. at 813. The court noted that the term partial birth abortion has never "been used in
any medical text or journal." Id.
87. Id. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the term partial birth abortion
clearly meant D & X procedure. As the court stated, the terms D & X and partial birth abortion
received differently definitions by the Commonwealth Attorneys, the AMA, the Virginia
statute, and the affidavits filed by the defendants. Id. at 813-14.
88. iiF. Supp.2dat~l4.
89. Id. citing Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F.Supp. 847, 854 (N.D. II1. 1998), and Evans v.
Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1306 (E.D. Mich 1997).
90. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 814. "Because vaginal delivery is a necessary part of every safe and
common method of abortion, a physician performing an abortion always deliberately and
intentionally 'delivers' a fetus, or a portion thereof, into the vagina." Id. This observation by the
court related to the statute's use of the term "delivers" in defining partial birth abortion as "an
abortion in which the person performing the abortion deliberately and intentionally delivers a
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define partial birth abortion in the Virginia statute.92 The court found
the term living fetus vague because "people of common intelligence
could differ as to the meaning and interpretation of the term 'living
fetus.' 93 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the words living fetus
fail the vagueness standard because several other courts expressed
trouble defining this term.94 Finally, the Richmond Medical Center
court found that a living fetus could be delivered in suction curettage
and D & E abortions.95
The court concluded its analysis by investigating the meaning of
"substantial portion thereof," another term used in the statute.96 The
plaintiffs argued that the statute failed to specify the exact amount of
a fetus necessary to constitute a substantial portion, and one of the
plaintiff's testified that the term possibly meant "a hand or a leg.",
97
92. Id. at 815. The statute uses the term living fetus in defining a partial birth abortion as,
"an abortion in which the person performing the abortion deliberately and intentionally delivers
a living fetus or a substantial portion thereof into the vagina." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2(1)
(emphasis added).
93. I 1F.Supp.2dat815.
94. Id. The court cited Planned Parenthood of Southern Arizona, Inc. v. Woods, 982 F.
Supp. 1369, 1379 (D. Ariz. 1997), in which the District Court for Arizona expressed its
difficulty with the term as follows:
Does "living fetus" ... refer to the presence of a fetal heartbeat? Alternatively, does
living fetus refer to living cells? As demonstrated by the testimony in this case,
reasonable physicians differ as to the meaning of what is "living." In addition, the Act
does not define when fetal death occurs.
Id. at 1379. The court in Richmond Medical Center cited other courts that sustained vagueness
challenges to statutes using the words living fetus. See Ryan, 995 F. Supp. at 854. In Hope
Clinic, the court reasoned that, "[w]ithout a clear definition in the statute as to the meaning of
the term 'living,' a physician cannot know whether her conduct falls within the statute's reach."
Id. Like the court in Hope Clinic, the court in Richmond Medical Center expressed concern
with the idea that a doctor might not know whether his conduct falls within the scope of the
statute. II F. Supp. 2d at 815. The Richmond Medical Center court noted that:
[W]hile performing a suction curettage or D & E procedure, [a doctor] does not know
the exact point at which the fetus dies, and that depending on the definition of the
term, the fetus might still be "living" while a substantial portion of a disarticulated
fetus is brought into the vagina.
Id
95. Id
96. Id at 816. The Virginia statute defines partial birth abortion as, "an abortion in which
the person performing the abortion deliberately and intentionally delivers a living fetus or a
substantial portion thereof into the vagina ...." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2(D) (emphasis
added).
97. 11F. Supp. 2dat816.
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The defendants' experts similarly failed to offer a specific definition
of a substantial portion of a fetus.98 The court, relying on the differing
expert opinions and lack of a common medical definition, held that
"there is certainly grave doubt that the term... supplies the kind of
notice requirement to avoid a finding of vagueness or whether the
term is sufficient to prevent arbitrary prosecution."
99
After discussing the arguably vague terms the Richmond Medical
Center court analyzed how different constructions of the terms
brought the procedures performed by the plaintiffs within the scope
of the statute.'00 First, the court determined that suction curettage, the
most common abortion procedure during the first trimester of
pregnancy, potentially fell within the proscriptions of the statute.'
0 '
The court reasoned further that the D & E procedure, the most
frequent form of second trimester abortion, also potentially fell




101. Id. at 816. The court reasoned that
[I]n a suction curettage procedure, as performed by the plaintiffs, the physician
"delivers" portions of the fetus from the uterus into and through the vagina through a
cannula. The physician does not know when the fetus "dies" and it is entirely possible
that the fetus may still be "living" when portions of the fetus are in the vagina, with
other portions remaining in the uterus. Further, according to the testimony of Dr.
Jones, it is possible at the early stages of gestation for a suction procedure to result in
the entire fetus being brought into the cannula, and hence into and through the vagina,
intact. ... [Tjhe physician would not know how long the heartbeat of the fetus would
continue after removal.
On this record, it appears that, during a suction curettage procedure, the physician
could "deliver" a "living fetus" or a "substantial portion thereof' into the vagina, for
the purpose of performing a procedure with the intent of killing the fetus, which kills
the fetus, and then complete the delivery. So construed, the physician would appear to
violate the Act when performing the suction curettage procedure.
Id. at 816-17.
102. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 817. The court reasoned that
[I]n performing a D & E... [o]ten, the physician will bring into the vagina a fetal leg
or arm which remains attached to the thorax of the fetus still in the uterus .... [A]
physician "can neither predict nor control whether, in the course of the D & E, such an
event will occur while the fetus is still alive." If "substantial portion thereof' is defined
to encompass a fetal arm or leg, this procedure would come within the ambit of the Act
because a "substantial portion" of the fetus would have been "delivered" into the
vagina, and the fetus may still be "living" while the physician uses forceps to complete
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curettage and D & E were both potentially proscribed by the statute
because the terms defining partial birth abortion (i.e., delivers, living
fetus, and substantial portion thereof) potentially included suction
curettage and D & E procedures.
10 3
As a result of the findings regarding the definition of partial birth
abortion, the court in Richmond Medical Center held that the
plaintiffs proved the statute failed to provide fair notice of the
conduct prohibited. 04 In addition, the court found that the plaintiffs
proved a "substantial likelihood of success" on the merits of their
vagueness challenge. °0
The next task faced by the Richmond Medical Center court
involved a determination of whether the plaintiffs proved a
"substantial likelihood of success" on the merits of their undue
burden challenge. 1 The court reviewed the precedent set in Roe and
Casey. 0 7 In Richmond Medical Center, the court noted that the case
law stood for five principles that are relevant to the case at bar.
108
First, the State may not place an undue burden on (or substantial
obstacle in the path of) a woman's choice to have an abortion pre-
viability.'0 9 The second principle recognizes the State's interest in
potential life but warns that the State may not take measures to
promote its interest if they place an undue burden on women seeking
abortions." 0 The court's third principle as allows the State to take
the procedure which kills the fetus... and finishes the delivery.
• [I]n some cases, during a D & E procedure, the physician may remove the entire
fetus from the uterus into the vagina in an intact condition.
Id (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 818. See also supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
104. 11F.Supp.2dat819.
105. Id. After attempting to understand the proscriptions of Virginia's partial birth abortion
statute, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs "raised questions going to the merits so serious,
substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them grounds for more deliberate investigation."
Id
106. Id.
107. Id. at 819-21 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-66, and Casey, 505 U.S. at 846).
108. Id at 821-22 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-79).
109. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 821.
110. Id. The court found that:
To promote the State's profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the
State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is informed, and measures
designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to
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measures to benefit the mother's health, but not unnecessary
measures that "have the purpose or effect" of placing an undue
burden on the mother's right to have an abortion.' Fourth, the "State
may not prohibit any woman" from obtaining an abortion pre-
viability." 2 Finally, the fifth principle states that "subsequent to
viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of
human life may, if it chooses, regulate and even proscribe abortion
except where it is necessary... for the preservation for the life or
health of the mother."
I 3
The court in Richmond medical Center first applied the fifth
principle to the facts of the case to determine whether the absence of
a maternal health provision in the statute violated Roe and Casey.,"
4
The court stated that Casey requires a maternal health exception and
reached the holding that because the Virginia statute lacked a
maternal health exception, the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits of their undue burden argument." s The court's decision
correctly follows Roe, because in Roe, the Court held that "a state
criminal abortion statute.., that excepts from criminality only a life-
saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to
persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be
an undue burden on the right.
Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (emphasis in original).
113. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-79 (1992) (emphasis in original)).
114. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 822. The plaintiffs asserted that without a matemal health exception
the statute clearly fell within the proscriptions of Roe and Casey. Id. The defendants argued that
"Roe and Casey are inapplicable because, in those decisions, the Supreme Court did not
announce constitutional protections to abortions where 'the child is partially bom."' Id. The
court rejected the defendants' argument stating that "Roe and Casey established the line of
demarcation for a state's ability to regulate and proscribe abortion in terms of whether the fetus
was viable or nonviable, not in terms of whether a fetus was in the process of being bom." Id
(citing Casey, 505 U.S. 879).
115. Id. at 825. The court considered the plaintiffs' arguments regarding the matemal
health exception because the statute potentially applied to the D & E and suction curettage
procedures performed by the plaintiffs. Id.; see also supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, the court noted that, even if the statute did not apply to suction curettage or D & E
abortions, "Roe and Casey are clear that, although a State may proscribe abortion at viability, it
must include exceptions for the life and health of the mother so as to avoid violating the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 11 F. Supp. 2d at 823. The court also noted
that, even though the Virginia statute contained a maternal life exception, under precedent, the
statute must also contain a maternal health exception. Id.
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pregnancy stage and without recognition of other interests involved,
is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."1l 6 The Virginia statute certainly constitutes a state
criminal abortion statute that excepts from criminality only a life-
saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to
pregnancy stage and without recognition of other interests involved.
In its analysis, the court in Richmond Medical Center further
considered whether procedures performed by the plaintiffs, "which
appear to fall within the reach of the Act, are 'necessary' to save the
health of the mother."' 17 The court noted that the D & E procedure is
the safest method of abortion for the mother in the second trimester
of pregnancy. 118 The court stated that, .'[I]t follows that a statute
which bans a common abortion procedure would constitute an undue
burden under Casey because 'an abortion regulation which inhibits
the vast majority of second trimester abortions would clearly have the
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking a previability abortion."' 1'9  Accordingly, the Richmond
Medical Center court held that the plaintiffs presented a strong
argument that the statute poses an unconstitutional burden on a
woman's right to seek pre-viability abortions and, further, that they
116 Id. at164.
117. Id
118. Id. at 825. The court listed the main reasons for preferring D & E procedures to the
available, non-surgical alternative of labor induction procedures. Id. at 824. First, "the main risk
of induction stems from the fact that it involves the same medical complications as labor and
delivery at full term." Id. This fact indicates that if an abortion becomes necessary for the health
or the life of the mother, any alternative to a D & E procedure involves the same risks as
carrying the fetus to term. Therefore, the D & E procedure may be necessary to save the life or
health of the mother. Second, the court found that a D & E procedure takes less time and causes
less pain for the mother than the alternatives. Id. Third, the court observed that "the
physiological stress of the labor itself makes induction relatively more dangerous and is often
contraindicated for women with various medical conditions." Id. Finally, the court noted that
"'labor inducing-medication can . lead to potentially fatal heart, lung, and kidney problems."
Id. The court also noted the plaintiff's evidence that "where induction is contraindicated for a
woman, D & E procedures are the only safe abortion procedures available that do not involve
major surgery." Id. (emphasis added). Finally, the court compared the D & E procedure to the
hysterectomy and hysterotomy (the major surgical alternatives) and found that D & E is 'far
preferable 'to [both] because these two procedures entail the risks of major surgery ... [a]nd,
the mortality rate associated with these two procedures is more than 10 times that associated
with the D & E." Id.
119. Id. at 825 (quoting Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187,
201 (6th Cir. 1997)).
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demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.120 The statute
likely created an undue burden, according to the court, because it
proscribed the safest and most common pre-viability, second term
abortion procedure.
21
The court in Richmond Medical Center analyzed the public
interest factor to determine whether to grant an injunction.' 22 First,
the court acknowledged the competing interests in the case: a
mother's right to an abortion pre-viability without an undue burden,
and her right to have an abortion post-viability in order to protect her
health or life; physicians' rights to provide medical care; and the
state's interest in potential life. 23 The court recognized that in
determining whether to issue an injunction, "an important aspect...
is the need to 'maintain the status quo . . . provided that it can be
done without imposing too excessive an interim burden upon the
defendant."
' 124
The court correctly found that, preventing the application of the
statute until adjudication on the merits, the status quo remained.
125
This position constitutes the only logical view because at the time of
the decision, the statute had not taken effect and, therefore, the status
quo consisted of life before the application of the statute. The court
judiciously held that the public interest required an injunction
because "the public is certainly interested in the prevention of
enforcement of [laws] which may be unconstitutional.' 26
Finally, the court in Richmond Medical Center issued an
injunction preventing the application of the Virginia statute until the
issues presented by the plaintiffs could be decided on the merits.
127
The author again agrees with the Richmond Medical Center court in
120. Id. at 827.
121. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 827. The court found that the plaintiffs had to choose between
providing D & E abortions and risking prosecution or discontinuing the procedure, thereby
denying women the abortion procedure and consequently imposing an undue burden on a
women's right to seek an abortion. Id.
122. Id. at 827-29.
123. Id. at 827.
124. Id. at 828 (quoting Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 727 (4th Cir. 1986)).
125. 11 F. Supp. 2d at 828.
126. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 822
F.2d 1390, 1400 (6th Cir. 1987)).
127. Id. at 829.
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its conclusion because the statute likely remains unconstitutionally
vague due to the terms that lack an obvious definition. In addition,
the author believes that statute clearly violates the clear dictates of
Roe and Casey, regarding any abortion statute to contain maternal
health and life exceptions. Finally, the author holds the opinion that
the operation of the Virginia statute imposes an undue burden on a
woman's right to seek an abortion because it arguably proscribes the
two most common and safe abortion procedures. This proscription
forces physicians to refuse to offer their services to women, or to
offer the services under the fear of criminal prosecution.
III. PROPOSAL
The Virginia legislature should repeal the statute prohibiting
partial birth abortions because of its vagueness and because it
imposes an unconstitutional burden on a woman's right to an
abortion. First, the legislature should recognize, as the court stated in
Richmond Medical Center, that ordinary people cannot possibly
understand the conduct prohibited by the vague terms of the statute.
Because the court, the plaintiffs, and the defendants failed to agree on
the meaning of the terms, neither can ordinary people understand
their meaning. Second, the legislature needs to recognize that the
statute places an unconstitutional burden on a woman's right to have
an abortion because the statute lacks a maternal health exception, as
required by Roe and Casey. The statute also places physicians in a
predicament of choosing between refusing to offer the two most
common and safe abortion services to mothers or to offer the services
under the fear of criminal prosecution.
If, however, the Virginia legislature remains intent on prohibiting
D & X abortions, the legislature must change the wording of the
statute to define the following terms more precisely: delivers, living
fetus, and substantial portion thereof. In addition, the statute should
specifically proscribe as partial birth abortions, the procedure defined
as D & X by the ACOG and the AMA. The defendants in Richmond
Medical Center claimed the statute only targeted D & X abortions.
The author recognizes the legislative reluctance to define the term
partial birth abortion because of the fear that abortion providers
would change their techniques slightly to remove the intended
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procedures from the proscriptions of the statute. Nevertheless, the
evidence in Richmond Medical Center suggests that physicians lack
control over the method by which the fetus is delivered,
dismembered, or killed. Absent a narrow definition of partial birth
abortion, therefore, a statute proscribing partial birth abortions
imposes an undue burden on women seeking abortions as evidenced
by the Virginia statute. In addition, if the Virginia legislature intends
to prohibit D & X abortions, Roe and Casey require that any statute
prohibiting abortions post-viability contain a maternal health and life
exception; therefore, further drafts of the statute must include both
exceptions.
In conclusion, the Virginia statute must be repealed by the
legislature or overruled by a court because it fails to meet
constitutional requirements in its current form. If, however, the
legislature decides to keep a partial birth abortion statute, the
legislature must clearly and narrowly define the terms in the statute.
Moreover, to prevent the statute from constituting an undue burden,
the statute must contain both a maternal health and a maternal life
exception.
CONCLUSION
The Virginia statute is unconstitutionally vague because it
contains several terms that lack obvious definition. As noted above,
neither the court, the plaintiffs, nor the defendants in Richmond
Medical Center agree on definitions for the terms partial birth
abortion, delivers, living fetus, and substantial portion thereof. The
author believes that statute remains unconstitutional because it fails
to contain a maternal health exception, thereby violating the clear
dictates of Roe and Casey. Finally, the author holds the opinion that
the operation of the Virginia statute imposes an undue burden on a
woman's right to seek an abortion because it proscribes the two most
common and safe abortion procedures.
The legislature should repeal the statute because of its several
constitutional infirmities. Alternately, a court deciding the issues
presented in Richmond Medical Center must invalidate the statute as
unconstitutional based on the district court's analysis. If, however,
the Virginia legislature retains a partial birth abortion statute, the
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legislature needs to define the terms of the statute narrowly and with
sufficient definiteness. In addition, if the Virginia legislature remains
determined to have a partial birth abortion statute, the legislature
should define the specific types of abortion that it intends to prohibit.
Finally, any new version of the statute must contain a maternal health
and matemal life exception as required by Roe and Casey.
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